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Abstract—We present a new model for undeniable signatures: 
fair-anonymous undeniable signatures. This protocol can not only 
preserve the privacy of the signer (i.e. anonymity) but also track the 
illegal utilization of the valid signatures.  In addition, our model 
prevents the trusted centre from forging a valid signature for any 
signer.
Keywords—Cryptography, Fair Anonymity, Information 
Security, RSA Signatures,   Undeniable Signatures.   
I. INTRODUCTION
s the Information Technology’s presence gets larger and 
more pronounced, we can expect to see some changes. 
Many of those changes have already started to happen. 
The most attractive characteristics for those changes are: 
Multi-user electronic commerce is more and more concerning 
the issue of security and privacy. Various solutions were 
proposed for this issue, for example, encryption technique, 
digital signature technique (including general signature 
scheme, blind signature scheme, undeniable signature scheme, 
group signature scheme, etc.), and other cryptographic 
techniques [16], as well as steganography techniques. 
Anonymity and fair anonymity are one of the important goals 
achieved by some of these techniques. 
    Undeniable signatures are one of the techniques, which can 
help to achieve anonymity and fair anonymity. Undeniable 
signatures, first devised by David Chaum and Hans van 
Antwerpen [4], are non self-authenticating (i.e. non universal 
verifiability) signature schemes, where signatures can only be 
verified with the consent of the signer (e.g. a company). 
However, if a signature is only verifiable with the aid of a 
signer, a dishonest signer may refuse to authenticate a genuine 
document. Undeniable signatures solve this problem by 
adding a new component called the denial protocol in addition 
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to the normal components of signature and verification.  That 
is, undeniable signatures have two distinctive features:  
1. The verification process is interactive, so the signer 
can limit who (e.g. payee) can verify their signature.  
2. A disavowal protocol, that is a cryptographic 
protocol which will allow them to prove that a given 
signature is a forgery.  
The first property means that a signer can allow only those 
who are authorized to access the document to verify their 
signature. If the document were to be leaked to a third party, 
the third party would be unable to verify that the signature is 
genuine.  However because of this property it means that the 
signer may deny a signature which was valid. To prevent this 
we have the second property, a method to prove that a given 
signature is a forgery. 
    The protection of signatures from being verified without the 
permission of the signer is not only justified by confidentiality 
and privacy concerns but it also opens a wide range of 
applications where verifying a signature is a valuable 
operation by itself. A typical scenario is the case of a software 
company that uses signature confirmation as a means to 
provide a proof of authenticity of their software to authorized 
(e.g., paying) customers only. This example illustrates the 
core observation on which the notion of undeniable signatures 
stands: verification of signatures, and not only their 
generation, is a valuable resource to be protected.
So far, various undeniable signatures have been created, 
[2]-[5], [7], [9], [11]-[13], [15], [17]. Those schemes provided 
undeniability analysis (including completeness, soundness, 
and zero-knowledge). However, it will be more interesting if 
anonymity for undeniable signatures are proposed in today's 
electronic commerce. Galbraith and Mao [7] constructed such 
a scheme and provided the anonymity analysis. However, 
their scheme only proposed perfect anonymity. That is, their 
scheme always preserves the privacy of signers in any case 
and the signers have perfect privacy. Therefore, users may ask 
such an interesting problem: how can we identify the signer 
who did anything illegal by taking advantage of the 
undeniable signature scheme. 
     In this paper, we solve the above problem. Moreover, the 
proposed undeniable signature scheme has the significant 
properties of undeniability and fair anonymity, 
simultaneously. In addition, we also have improved the result 
reported in [18]. In our scheme, a trusted center is involved. 
In practical scenario, a bank or a government will play the role 
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of a trusted center. From some point of view, they act as the 
authorized organizations.  
 The organization of the rest of this paper is as follows. In 
section 2, we first provide the definition of fair anonymous 
undeniable signature. In section 3, the fair-anonymous 
undeniable signature scheme is proposed. In section 4, the 
analysis and proofs are provided, mainly including 
unforgeabiligy and undeniability, as well as fair anonymity – a 
very important property for a practical undeniable signature 
scheme. The performance analysis and the conclusions appear 
in section 5 and section 6, respectively. 
II. DEFINITION OF FAIR-ANONYMOUS UNDENIABLE 
SIGNATURES
   In this section, we will provide the definition of fair 
anonymous undeniable signatures (or fair AUS). 
   A fair anonymous undeniable signature (fair AUS) scheme 
consists of four algorithms, namely Setup, Key, Sign and 
DelAnonymity, and two protocols, namely Confirmation and 
Denial protocols. For every choice of the security parameter k
there is a public-key space K, a message space M and a 
signature space S. For our applications we stress that the space 
S must depend only on the security parameter k and not on a 
specific public key. 
   Setup is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm which 
takes as input a security parameter k and outputs a family of 
system parameters.
   Key is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm which is 
executed by a trusted centre and the signers. The input 
contains system parameters, as well as random parameters 
which are chosen by the trusted centre and the signers. The 
output includes a public key pk K and a corresponding secret 
key sk.
   Sign is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm, which 
takes as input a secret key sk and a message m M and 
outputs a  signature 
skSig S
. In general, there are many valid 
signatures for any pair ( , )m pk M K .
   Confirmation is a deterministic polynomial time protocol 
between a signer and a verifier (e.g. a payee). The input 
contains a message m M , a signature s S and a (certified) 
public key pk.  This protocol permits the signer to prove to a 
verifier that the signature s is valid on the message m and the 
public key pk. If the verifier has a suitable public key then the 
proof may be taken to be a non-interactive, designated-verifier 
proof. 
   Denial is a deterministic polynomial time protocol.  The  
public input includes  m M , s S and pk K . This protocol 
makes a signer  prove to a verifier that the given signature is 
not valid for the message and that public key.  
   DelAnonymity is a deterministic polynomial time 
algorithm, which is executed only by the trusted centre. The 
input includes m M , s S and some system parameters. 
The output is the identity of the originator for the signature   
s S .
Remark 1 For some undeniable signature schemes, the denial 
protocol may be the same as the confirmation protocol from 
the point of the initial state of the protocol. 
III. THEORETICAL FOUNDATION OF FAIR AUS 
   The proposed scheme consists of the following algorithms: 
Setup, Key, Sign, Confirm, Deny, DelAnonymity. Details of 
them are described as follows: 
 We first present the setup for the proposed fair anonymous 
undeniable signature scheme. Afterwards, the main steps of 
the protocol are provided.  
A. Setup Algorithm 
   The Setup algorithm is a probabilistic polynomial algorithm. 
It is carried out by a trusted center.  
   (1) The trusted center chooses N pairs of primes 
{ , }i ip q (1 )i N , where 3(mod4)i ip q , and all prime factors 
of ( 1) / 2ip  and ( 1) / 2iq are greater than a soundness bound B
as in [9].  
   (2) She computes 




i i ne d
 such 
that 1 (mod ( ))i i ie d n  where ( )  is Euler phi function. 
    (3)  The family {( , , , , ) |1 }i i i i in p q e d i N forms the database 
of the trusted center. 
    (4)   She sends the ciphertext of { , , }i i in e d to isigner  for 
1 i N ; here the trusted center uses the Cramer-Shoup public 
key encryption system [6] to encrypt { , , }i i in e d .
(5) Let *{0,1}D  be the document space, in which the 
messages will be signed.  
B. Key Algorithm 
   The Key algorithm is a probabilistic polynomial time 
algorithm, which is executed by the signers. 
    (1) For any 1 i N , the 
isigner  gets the ciphertext of 
{ , , }i i in e d  from the trusted center, and then decrypts it.  
     (2) He chooses *,
i
R
i i nx y  and computes  
2( ) modi i i ig x y n  and  (mod )
ie
i i ih g n .
     (3) Finally he gets  { , , , , }i i i i i iSK n e d x y  as the private 
key, and  { , , }i i i iPK n g h as the public key. 
C. Sign Algorithm 
   The Sign algorithm is still a probabilistic polynomial time 
algorithm. Given any message M D, and  
{ , , , , }i i i i i iSK n e d x y  and { , , }i i i iPK n g h  respectively being 
the private key and public key of isigner .






1 ( || ) (mod )
i ig r d
i is x H M r n
 and  
2 ( || ) (mod )
ird
i is yH M r n
.
(2) He then calculates '
c c c is s b n
 for {1, 2}c , where 
cb  are 
chosen so that '| | .cs k
(3) He then obtains a signature ' '
1 2{ , , ( || )}s s H M r  for M .
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D. Confirm or Deny  Algorithm 
   The Confirm or Deny algorithm is a deterministic 
polynomial time algorithm. They are the interactive 
algorithms between the signers and the verifiers. To confirm 
or deny an alleged undeniable signature ' '
1 2{ , , ( || )}s s H M r , the 
isigner  executes the non-interactive, designated verifier 
versions of the proofs ( [14]) which prove the two 
relationships: 
1. (mod )idi i ig h n    
2. 2 2' ' ?
1 2( (mod )) ( || ) (mod )
i ie g
i i is s n hH M r n
E. DelAnonymity Algorithm 
   The DelAnonymity algorithm is also a deterministic 
polynomial time algorithm. The executing of this algorithm is 
only titled to the trusted center.  
  (1) When certain emergence case appears, the trusted center 
will quickly be “on-line” and search her database.  
  (2) For i=1 to N, the trusted center checks whether  
                2 2' '
1 2( (mod )) ( || ) (mod )
i ie g
i i is s n h H M r n                  (1) 
If there exists an I  such that  
                2 2' '
1 2( (mod )) ( || ) (mod )
I Ie g
I I Is s n h H M r n                 (2) 
then the trusted center will tell us that it is just the Isigner
who has signed the signature ' '
1 2{ , , ( || )}s s H M r .
Prior to going further, we give the following remarks. 
Remark 2: The proposed fair anonymous undeniable 
signature scheme can be used to sign various messages, 
including short messages and long messages. That is, there is 
no limit on the length of messages to be signed.   
IV. THEOREM PROOF AND CASE STUDIES AGAINST ATTACK
     This section we will analyze our undeniable signature 
scheme and come up with all the proofs of the scheme. We 
will prove that our scheme has the significant properties: 
unforgeability, undeniability and fair anonymity. 
A. Unforgeability  
   Unforgeability means that illegal entity can not create a 
valid undeniable signature which can successfully pass the 
check of the Confirmation protocol and the Denial protocol. 
By comparision, the trusted center should have higher 
probability than an outside adversary in forging a valid 
signature successfully, since she knows more secret 
information about the signers than an adversary does. So it 
would be much convincible if we can prove that even the 
trusted center is not able to impersonate any legal singer to 
forge a valid signature.
Theorem 1 The trusted center is not able to impersonate any 
legal signer to forge a valid signature. 
We can prove this theorem by considering two cases of attack 
made by the center: 
Case 1:       The trusted center cannot reveal the private key 
from the public key or her database for any signer. Since 
ix ,
iy  are only known by each isigner  and even if the trusted 
center knows the factorization of 





 from 2( ) modi i i ig x y n .   
Lemma 1 Given the factorization of 
in , for reasonably large 
number 
ig , the probability of the trusted center recovering ix
and  
iy  from 
2( ) modi i i ig x y n  is negligible with respect to 
the fair anonymous undeniable signature scheme. 
Proof  Since 
in  is a composite number, by the number theory, 
for large number 
ig , )(mod ii ng  has four different square roots 
corresponding to the equation  2( ) modi i i ig x y n . Let these 
roots be respectively:   
        )(mod1 inX , )(mod2 inX , )(mod3 inX , )(mod4 inX .
For each case,  )(mod iiij nyxX
 (for 41 j )
is an uncertain equation with two different unknown elements. 
Suppose it has  
j
 pairs of solutions, i.e. 


























Then, the equation 2( ) modi i i ig x y n  with ix  and  iy  being 
the unknown elements has  
                 
4321
 different pairs of solutions. 
Therefore, the probability  of the trusted center recovering 
ix  and  iy  from 
2( ) modi i i ig x y n  for the fair anonymous 




. By the 
property of 
in
, with certain high probability we know that  
]2[4321 ig
, where ]2[ ig  is the least integer greater than 
or equal to 
2
ig . Therefore, the above probability is negligible. 
Case 2:       The trusted center cannot forge valid signatures  
by making adaptive queries to the scheme. We can prove this  
point according to the unforgeability security of our scheme. 
Theorem 2   The proposed scheme is secure against chosen
message attack under the condition that the underlying RSA  
signature  is unforgeable against chosen message attack. 
Proof We first investigate the plain RSA signature: 
                          Message:   M
                          Signature:  (mod )ds M n
It is well known that the plain RSA signature is not 
unforgeable against the adaptive chosen message attack.  
Hence some researchers for example Bellare and Rogaway [1]  
suggest using the padding scheme for the plain RSA signature  
 in order to make it unforgeable against the adaptive chosen  
message attack. Therefore, the regular RSA signature has the 
following formulas: 
    Message:   M
    Signature: ( ) modds E M n
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In the above signature, ( )E M  is the encapsulation of the 
message M [16]. For example, M can be hashed by a padding 
scheme ( )H M r , where ( )H  is a collision-free hash function, 
and r  is chosen randomly from *
n
 . By the report in [1], we 
know that the regular RSA signature is unforgeable against 
chosen message attack. 
Now let us return to our undeniable signature: Suppose 
' '
1 2{ , , ( || )}s s H M r  is a valid signature for a message M; Then   
                   ( )'
1 ( || ) (mod )
i ig r d
i is x H M r n                             (3) 
                   '
2 ( || ) (mod )
ird
i is y H M r n
                             (4) 
 We will transform 
'
1s  and 
'
2s  as follows: 








( || ) (mod )
( || ) (mod )
( || ) (mod )



















s x H M r n
x H M r n
x H M r n
x H M r n
                          (5) 
and 





( || ) (mod )
( || ) (mod )
( || ) (mod )



















s y H M r n
y H M r n
y H M r n
y H M r n
                              (6) 
     By the underlying scheme, only isigner  knows the values 
of ie , ix  and iy . Naturally we can view  
( )
( || )i i
e g r
ix H M r
and ( || )ie riy H M r  as the encapsulation of M. Therefore, the new 
undeniable signature is equivalent to its underlying regular 
RSA signature. However, the regular RSA signature is secure 
against chosen message attack [1]. Hence, our scheme is also 
secure against chosen message attack. 
B. Undeniability 
   Undeniability means that the proposed scheme has the 
completeness, soundness, and zero-knowledge for both the 
Confirmation and Denial protocol. In order to prove the new 
scheme has the undeniability property, we have to respectively 
transform the Confirm or Deny algorithm of the scheme into 
the confirmation protocol and the denial protocol that are 
designated verifier proofs. 
     Here we assume the designated verifier Bob is honest in 
the protocol. In fact, because of the trapdoor commitment 
scheme we use in the following, the verifier is permitted to be 
dishonest. 
Confirmation Protocol:  Given an alleged signature 
' '
1 2{ , , ( || )}s s H M r  on message M.
1. Bob chooses *
1 2, nt t  randomly, finds 11 (mod )
tC h n
and 2' '
2 1 2( ) (mod )
tC s s n , and sends them to the signer. 
2. The signer computes 
1 1 (mod )
dR C n  and 
2
2 2 (mod )
eR C n , and then computes the commitment 
1 1( )W Commit R  and 2 2( )W Commit R  to 1R  and 2R
respectively, where ( )Commit  is a trapdoor commitment 




 to Bob. 




, Bob sends 
1t  and 2t  to the 




 are correctly 
formed, then opens 
1W  and 2W  for Bob. Finally Bob gets 
1R  and 2R .
4. The verifier Bob will be verifying that: 
1
1 (mod )
tR g n   and  222 ( || ) (mod )
gt
R hH M r n .
If  this is the case, Bob accepts the signature to be valid. 
Otherwise, the invalidity of the signature is “undetermined”. 
Theorem 3 The confirmation protocol derived from the 
Confirm or Deny algorithm has the following properties. 
Completeness:   If ' '
1 2{ , , ( || )}s s H M r on message M is 
computed correctly, then Bob will accept the proof of the 
signer.  
Soundness:  If ' '
1 2{ , , ( || )}s s H M r  is an invalid signature on M,
then signer, even computationally unbounded, cannot 
convince Bob to accept her proof with probability better than 
1/ B .
Zero-knowledge:  When the signer behaves correctly in the 
protocol, Bob gains no useful information except the validity 
of the proof. 
Proof Completeness:  If ' '
1 2{ , , ( || )}s s H M r
 on message M has 
been formed correctly and the signer executes the protocol 
honestly, then it is easy to see Bob will accept the signer’s 
proof. Therefore, the completeness comes here.   
Soundness:  Let ' '
1 2{ , , ( || )}s s H M r
 be an invalid signature on 
message M.  Now the signer will try to convince the verifier 
that the signature is valid. In order to estimate the cheating 
probability of the signer, we can assume that this is in the 
worst case for the verifier, and the best case for the signer. 
Without lost of generality, we may assume in the confirmation 
protocol all the first three steps have passed the verifier’s 
check successfully. Therefore, the signer’s cheating 
probability (i.e. to convince the verifier Bob to accept the 
proof) is maximized by choosing the two responses 
1R  and 
2R that pass the verifier’s test with maximum probability in 
step 2 and step 4 in the confirmation protocol. Note that the 
signer has the private key d and e,  so 
1R
 will definitely pass 
the check. Hence, the signer will choose a proper and tricky 
2R  in order to pass the test. 
   By the description above, we can write 1s  and 2s  as 
( )
1 ( || ) (mod )
g r ds aH M r n                               (7) 
2 ( || ) (mod )
rds bH M r n .                               (8) 
Here a x  and b y . Certainly, the values of a and b are not 
known to the signer. Now 2' '
2 1 2( ) (mod )
tC s s n , where  2t  is 
chosen by the verifier randomly. Note that the signer has to 
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come up with 
2R  before getting 2t . The verifier checks 
whether: 
              222
2 2 (mod ) ( || ) (mod )
gteR C n hH M r n ;     (9)   
              2 2 22 2 2( ) (mod ) ( || ) (mod )et gt gtab z n hH M r n .    (10) 
Therefore, 22( ) (mod )gth ab n .
   Note that a, b and 
2t  are information theoretically hidden 
with respect to the signer. Hence, if the signer wants to cheat 
successfully (i.e. pass the test), she will have no better strategy 
than guessing the value of 2t in the response 2R . Also, note 
that the order of *
n
is ( ) ( 1)( 1)i in p q , and all the prime 
factors of ( 1) / 2ip  and ( 1) / 2iq  are greater than B, the 
probability of the signer selecting 




pass the test is not greater than 1/ B . Hence, the soundness in 
the theorem is proved. 
Zero-knowledge:  When the signer behaves correctly and the 
input ' '
1 2{ , , ( || )}s s H M r  to the confirmation protocol is a valid 
undeniable signature on message M, there is a simulator that 
can simulate all the transcripts of the protocol. Therefore, the 
protocol is easily simulatable. Hence, it has the zero-
knowledge property. In fact, we construct the simulator as 
follows:     
1. The simulator chooses *, n  randomly; 
2. Computes 
1 (mod )C h n
 and ' '
2 1 2
( ) (mod )C s s n ;
3. Rewinds the verifier; 
4. Compute 
1 (mod )R g n  and 
2
2 ( || ) (mod )
gR hH M r n ;
5. Commits to 
1R  and 2R   respectively: 1 1( )W Commit R  and 
2 2( )W Commit R .
   Hence, by the construction of the simulator, the protocol can 
be simulated successfully. 
Lemma 2    We can derive a denial protocol from the Confirm 
or Deny algorithm of the new scheme and the derived denial 
protocol has the completeness, soundness and zero-knowledge 
properties. 
Proof  The proof is similar to that for Theorem 3.
Theorem 4 The proposed undeniable signature scheme has 
the undeniability property.  
Proof  By the proving of Theorem 3 and Lemma 2, it is 
known that the undeniable signature scheme has the 
undeniability. 
C. Fair Anonymity 
    In this section we prove that our new scheme has the fair 
anonymity. 
Lemma 3 In the random oracle model, our new undeniable 
signature scheme has the anonymity property under the 
assumption that the special composite decision Diffir-Hellman 
problem is hard and the trusted center is trusted. 
Proof The proof of the lemma is omitted here since it is 
similar to Theorem 5  and Corollary 1 in [8] (pp. 90-91). 
Lemma 4 The trusted center is able to revoke the anonymity 
of any signer from the undeniable signature scheme if there is 
some emergence case. 
Proof  By the construction of the new scheme we know the 
trusted center has a database. If some emergence case appears, 
for example, some 
isigner   does not use the scheme legally 
and that results a dispute. Then the trusted center will run the 
DelAnonymouity algorithm to revoke the anonymity of 
isigner . Therefore, relevant participants can know who 
signed the signature ' '
1 2{ , , ( || )}s s H M r
. In fact, the center will 
search her database.  For i=1 to N, she checks whether                  
                    2 2' '
1 2( (mod )) ( || ) (mod )
i ie g
i i is s n h H M r n
If there exists an I  such that                            
                    2 2' '
1 2( (mod )) ( || ) (mod )
I Ie g
I I Is s n h H M r n
,
then the trusted center will tell us that it is just the 
Isigner
who has signed the signature. Therefore, the trusted center is 
able to revoke the anonymity of any signer from the 
undeniable signature scheme. 
Theorem 5  The new undeniable signature scheme has the 
fair anonymity property. 
Proof By Lemma 3 and Lemma 4, we achieved the correctness 
of the theorem. 
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
The performance of our scheme is dominated by the 
calculations of exponentiation mod n operations as well as the 
Cramer-Shoup encryption/decryption of keys. Suppose that 
the times for performing multiplication and addition mod n 
operations could be ignored, then total computation cost of 
key generation and signing algorithm for each signer requires 
O(k3) exponentiation mod n operations.  
For the next steps, we will implement our scheme by JAVA 
or C.  
VI. CONCLUSIONS
     In this paper, we presented a new model for the undeniable 
signature scheme, i.e. the fair anonymous undeniable 
signature scheme. Our work mainly focuses on how to realize 
the fair anonymity (when it is needed) under the condition of 
preserving the anonymity of the signers. At the same time, we 
proved the new undeniable signature scheme has the 
undeniability property. 
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